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Abstract Although a number of authors have used diagrams extensively in their
studies of Navya-Nya¯ya, they have done so to explain and illustrate concepts, not
with the goal of reasoning with the diagrams themselves. Adherents of diagram-
matic reasoning have made claims for its potential by pointing to key structural
correspondences between diagrams and logical concepts, arguably lacking in sen-
tential representations, and describing these relations using concepts such as “well
matchedness” and “iconicity”. A canonical example of this iconicity is the use of
Euler diagrams to depict categorical syllogisms. Since the meaning of expressions
in Indian logic differs in so many important ways from logic in the Western tra-
dition, the use or adaptation of diagrams developed in the latter would seem to
preclude iconicity. Thus, the development of diagrams which reflect the nature of
inference in Navya-Nya¯ya, which centres on the anumāna inference schema, is
motivated. In this paper we extend Ganeri’s method of depicting the Vais´es
˙
ika
ontology with graphs to include syntax intended to expose the nature of anumāna.
The diagrams are given a formal basis: i.e. abstract syntax, inference rules defined
abstractly and a graph-theoretic semantics. These are the first formalised logical
diagrams that aim to reflect the nature of the anumāna inference. This paper lays the
way for further work in extending the formalism to cover more of Navya-Nyāya, and
in exploring a dialogue between properties of the formalism and of Navya-Nyāya.
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Introduction
Although none of the original Sanskrit authors whose work makes up the logico-
philosophical tradition of Navya-Nya¯ya used diagrams, modern authors have used a
variety of graphical notations to explain and illustrate the system. The author
recently surveyed these notations (Burton et al. 2018) (in collaboration with
Choudhury and Chakraborty), analysing the notations’ fitness-for-purpose according
to two main criteria: these were Charles Peirce’s categorisation of signs (Short
2009) (primarily, the concept of iconicity) and Cheng’s cognitive framework on the
effectiveness of diagrams (Cheng 2016). In that study we explained our view that
the use of spatial diagrams (Euler, Venn, linear diagrams etc), as some authors have
done (e.g. Chi 1990), is poorly matched to the meaning of Navya-Nya¯ya. Such
notations excel at representing syllogistic reasoning and were, to one degree or
another, developed with that process in mind. However, in ways that we explore
below, reasoning with anumāna is not syllogistic reasoning, justifying the search for
a more appropriate notation.
As a first step towards designing diagrams which are well matched to the
meaning of Navya-Nya¯ya, we begin by considering the structure of meaning in that
system. The semantics of Navya-Nya¯ya means that intension, i.e. individuals and
their properties, is of the first importance. In fact it may be no more correct to call
Navya-Nya¯ya intensional than it is to call it extensional, as it has features that
exhibit each perspective; an example of an extensional concept is anugama (Guha
2016, p. 209). What matters when constructing a sign which is iconic for reasoning,
which is what we will attempt to do, is to reveal the relationships that are essential
to inference. Rather than spatial notations designed to show the subsumption,
intersection or disjointness of concepts, diagrams based on various kinds of network
are more appropriate. Most diagrams found in the secondary Navya-Nya¯ya literature
are, in fact, topological notations based on networks; examples include the diagrams
of Wada (2007), Das (2006) and Ganeri (2001b). Each author had their own
(frequently overlapping) purposes in mind when developing their notations, such as
the depiction of vyāpti (Das) or ontology (Ganeri). Naturally, the success of the
results should be considered in light of their particular contexts. None of the
notations, however, was developed for use as a diagrammatic logic, i.e. for
reasoning by manipulation of the diagram and its parts in ways that correspond to
the process of inference in Navya-Nya¯ya. The absence of diagrammatic inference
rules is not the only obstacle; concepts which are key to visualising Nya¯yan
inference are missing. This includes notation to represent the likeness and unlikeness
classes which justify the use of examples. Furthermore, although the mapping
between a diagram and its underlying meaning may be more or less clear (Das, for
instance, provides an algorithm for reading his diagrams that can be used to
reconstruct the corresponding expression), each of the notations is explained
informally. Just as Euler diagrams can be said to possess the same relations as the
antecedents of a syllogistic argument, supporting inference by revealing that style of
reasoning “as it really is”, we seek to do the same for anumāna. This position is
explained further in “Source notations” section.
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It should be noted that, despite having the invaluable assistance of several
Sanskrit scholars thanked at the end of the article, this work is based on the author’s
understanding of secondary texts. Principal among these are Guha’s textbook
Navya-Nyāya System of Logic Guha (2016) and Ganeri’s Philosophy in Classical
India Ganeri (2001b), which provides inspiration for the diagrams. There is no one
“official” version of this philosophy, which developed over many centuries in a
process of disputation, clarification and detailed refinement. For our current
purpose, we leave Nyaya’s historical development to one side and take definitions
and concepts from Guha’s work op cit unless noted otherwise.
In the next section we establish some basic terms and concepts of Navya-Nya¯ya.
We then describe the source notations from which our diagrams take inspiration
(“Source notations” section), followed by the description of the diagrams
themselves, which we call anumāna diagrams. We do this by first giving an
overview of the drawn diagrams (“Anumāna diagrams with sapakṣa only” section),
then via the definition of their abstract syntax (“Abstract syntax” section) and
semantics (“Semantics” section). We do this for the simplest case of anumāna in
which only a positive corroborating example is provided, and then consider the case
when a counterexample is also given. In this latter case, we demonstrate the drawn
diagrams and, to avoid repetition, give a sketch of the extension to the formalism.
We conclude with a look ahead to future work, including extending the diagrams to
accommodate a larger fragment of Navya-Nya¯ya.
The basic terms and concepts of Navya-Nyāya
We will only attempt to describe those aspects of Navya-Nya¯ya that are needed in
order to understand the diagrams in later sections. Broader and more detailed
introductions can be found in, for instance, Ganeri (2001) and Guha (2016).
Navya-Nya¯ya, like all philosophical logic, is concerned with the analysis of
thought and the justification of reasoning. Unlike logics in the Western tradition, it
combines techniques of rhetoric (how to construct a convincing argument),
epistemology (the analysis of truth and knowledge) and logic proper (how to draw
valid conclusions on the basis of existing evidence). Nya¯ya (in its original and
“new” forms) is closely linked with the Vais´es
˙
ika school, from which it takes their
seven-part ontology wholesale. The Vais´es
˙
ika ontology divides objects in the real
world into seven types. A positive entity is either a universal, a quality, a motion, or
a substance (which may be compound or atomic) or an individuator Ganeri (2001b).
The types are distinguished from each other by inherence (samāvaya): the number
of entities each type inheres in and the number which may inhere in it. Nothing may
inhere in a universal, while universals inhere in qualities. For example, the universal
blueness inheres in a quality, blue, which is a particular shade of the colour.
Qualities inhere in substances; a particular shade of blue may inhere in a pot, for
example. A pot is a compound substance composed of smaller parts. The pot inheres
in each of those parts, all the way down to the atomic substances it is made of,
which inhere in nothing. The other type of entity which inheres in atomic substances
is the individuator, which allows us to distinguish one atom from another. The
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seventh type of entity is the negative entity of absence (abhāva). Since the
Nyaya¯ikas believe that every cognition has some content, when we perceive the
absence of a pot on the ground, that absence is an entity with real existence. What
we perceive in this case is an abhāva which is counter-positive (pratiyogi) to pot-
ness (the quality of being a pot) and which has an absential-spatial location in the
ground. This is an example of relational absence, and there are other varieties
dealing with temporal absence and inequality. Nothing inheres in a negative entity.
As we will see in the “Source notations” section, this model of reality is reflected to
a greater or lesser degree in the diagrams used to visualise Navya-Nya¯ya.
The usual introduction to Navya-Nya¯ya is via the anumāna, or inferential
schema. There are two varieties, with three and five steps respectively. The example
below is the five part variety, or pararthanumāna, with the wording taken from
Ingalls (1955):
Anumāna 1
1. Thesis: Word is non-eternal.
2. Reason: Because it possesses the property of being produced.
3. Statement of pervasion and example(s): What possesses the property of being
produced is seen to be non-eternal, as a pot. What possesses the property of not
being produced is seen to be eternal, as the soul.
4. Application: It (word) is like this (i.e. possesses the property of being produced).
5. Conclusion: Therefore word is non-eternal.
When this logical structure was introduced to the West in 1824 by Colebrooke it
was named the “Indian syllogism”. This choice of name formed part of the
misunderstanding of Indian logic in the West that was to last the best part of a
century. Compared to Aristotle’s syllogistic, pararthanumāna may seem to be
inadequate in several respects: particularly, its repetition (steps 1 and 5) and the
redundant and distracting appeal to examples in step 3. The history of these
misunderstandings is described by Ganeri (2001a).
In fact, pararthanumāna bears no real resemblance to syllogistic reasoning. It is
not concerned with classes of things, relations between classes or membership of
those classes. Its content concerns individuals, their pervasion by properties and an
inference that can be made thereby. Mullick explains that the distinction between
implication and entailment is key to (mis)understanding the nature of inference in
pararthanumāna, which should be seen as an inference schema or rule rather than a
series of propositions. Implication “holds by virtue of the meaning-content of
propositions rather than their truth-values, [and] this must itself be because of the
concepts they contain.” Mullick described the inference taking place in
pararthanumāna as “conceptual implication”. Furthermore, pararthanumāna is a
schema because although each example discusses particular objects (words,
hillsides and so on) the role of these “paradigmatic” objects is as placeholders for
any objects or properties that stand in the given relations to each other (Mullick
1976).
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Two of the key notions at work in anumāna are locus and locatee. In the example
above, the loci are word (which is the pakṣa, or locus that we want to reach a
conclusion about), pot (the sapakṣa, or example which is claimed to be like the
pakṣa) and soul (the vipakṣa, the example which is claimed to be unlike the
pakṣa) (Guha 2016, p. 35). The locatees are the properties of being eternal, of being
produced, and the absence of each of those properties. Non-eternal-ness is the
sādhya, the target property or thing we want to prove is true of the pakṣa.
The treatment of relation is strongly intensional. The eternal-ness of an entity
such as a soul is conceived of as a quality which inheres in a locus. The quality is
thus delimited by and particular to the locus (through a process called
avacchedakatva, the delimitor/delimited relation) (Guha 2016, p. 17). The eternal-
ness of a given soul is not universal eternal-ness, and is not equivalent to the eternal-
ness of a separate entity. This approach extends to every cognition. To express the
notion “a pot is on the ground” the Nyaya¯ikas construct a statement equivalent to
“contact delimited by pot-ness inheres in the ground”. This approach was developed
to avoid the ambiguity of ordinary speech.
One of the most distinctive features of Navya-Nya¯ya is the treatment of absence
(abhāva) and negation. Recalling the example of our perception of the absence of a
pot on the ground, that absence is an entity with real existence. In this case,
“absence delimited by pot-ness inheres in the ground”. Returning to the
pararthanumāna example above, for word to be non-eternal means that the absence
of eternal-ness is located in word; this absence is also located in pot but is not
located in soul (Guha 2016, pp. 76–99). Our second example of pararthanumāna,
which we will use to explain the third step and use of examples, is the most
commonly cited:
Anumāna 2
1. Thesis: This hill is fiery.
2. Reason: Because it is smoky.
3. Statement of pervasion and example(s): What possesses the property of being
smoky is also fiery, as in the kitchen hearth. What possesses the property of not
being smoky is not fiery, as in the lake.
4. Application: This hill is so.
5. Conclusion: Therefore this hill is fiery.
Step 3, the statement of pervasion and example(s), has been taken by various
authors as equivalent to a predicate logic expression such as 8x:SðxÞ ! FðxÞ: This
fails to reflect the intended meaning in several ways. Apart from S(x) and F(x) being
an inadequate way to represent the notions of locus, locatee and avacchedaka, this is
a statement about pervasion, as the name suggests. Entities which are pervaded by
smoke are necessarily pervaded by fire. This is about the relation between the
sādhya (target) and hetu (reason) properties. For the hetu to be a reliable reason
property, the sādhya must be seen wherever the hetu is seen. It is quite possible that
the sādhya is seen in some instances where the hetu is not; a red-hot iron is said by
the Nyaya¯ikas to possess fire but not smoke (Ganeri (2001b), p. 90). But it must
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certainly be true that the extent of the hetu is strictly contained within that of the
sādhya. This leads to the Buddhist logician Din˙na¯ga’s “reason with three
characteristics” (Ganeri 2001b, p. 115):
[A proper reason must be] present in the site of inference and what is like it
and absent in what is not.
How do we know the examples are well-chosen, and what is “like” and “unlike”
the site of inference? How do we know that there are no counterexamples yet to be
observed (a Black Swan event)? As pointed out by Din˙na¯ga, we are concerned here
with like and unlike in respect to the sādhya, not the hetu. In commentary on
Din˙na¯ga’s work, Dharmakirti went on to claim that there are three ways in which
hetu and sādhya may be linked: both properties may be linked to (possibly caused
by) the same phenomenon, may be linked by metaphysical causation, or we may
reach a conclusion about their interdependence based on the lack of counterexam-
ples. After observing some small number of examples we can be satisfied, and stop
looking. (Ganeri 2001b, p. 121) The reliance on the examples in pararthanumāna
can be problematic for readers hoping to understand Navya-Nya¯ya, leading some to
think that this is an informal case-based reasoning by analogy. However, if we
accept the validity of the existence of likeness and unlikeness classes and accept the
assumption that we are able to identify an example from each, then the status of
pararthanumāna as a formal inference schema is clear. Matilal puts it thus (Matilal
1991, quoted in Sen and Chatterjee 2010):
In short, the Nya¯ya strategy is to appeal to our intuitions about knowledge, in
order to learn something about reasoning and not vice versa.
In the next section we describe those diagrams used by modern authors which
have inspired our own, and make some observations about their potential
effectiveness for reasoning.
Source notations
The first source of inspiration for our diagrams are those that appear in Ramesh
Chandra Das’ translation of the classic nineteenth century primer, the Navya-
Nya¯yabhasapradipa of Mahesa Chandra Nya¯yaratna (Das 2006). To give a flavour
of the notation, Fig. 1 shows Das’ depiction of a mutual absence between “cloth”
and “pot”. These diagrams follow the node-link or network style employed earlier
by Wada (2001), but have a richer syntax that allows more kinds of information to
be expressed. Rectangles represent elements of a cognition (alternatively, ontolog-
ical entities) and downward arrows represent the inherence relation (samavāya).
Solid arrows which are not vertically oriented represent other relations and can be
labelled to indicate the relation in question. Arrows with a double edge () and,)
represent the uni- and bidirectional determinor relations (nirupya/nirupita and
nirupya/nirupaka). The “harpoon” (⥊) shows that one thing is counterpositive to
another and an arrow with a dashed edge indicates the denial of a relation. An
important innovation enables the reconstruction of a Navya-Nya¯ya expression from
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the diagram; this relies on the addition of the meta-diagrammatic feature of a
numbered circle to label contextual properties (Das refers to it as “an artificial
device”). Contextual properties are those that determine other entities, i.e. those
which are adjuncts in the nirūpakatva relation. The order in which contextual
properties are introduced affects the meaning of the expression, similar to the order
of quantifiers in sentential logic. The numbered circles in Das’ diagrams that label
contextual properties are to be read in order, producing the desired meaning.
The vocabulary of Das’ diagrams is given in Fig. 2. As stated above, orientation
has semantic importance. A set of nodes and edges arranged horizontally has a
different meaning to the same nodes and edges in a vertical arrangement. In Fig. 3,
because the nodes in the cognition on the left are arranged vertically, we read the
arrow as the locus/locatee (ādheya/ādhāra) or property/posessor (dharma/dharmin)
relation. In the right-hand cognition, the arrow could be any relation and (in the
absence of a label) all we know is that X is related to Y.
The analysis of Das’ diagrams in Burton et al. (2018) notes that they are richly
expressive (e.g., as compared to those of Wada) and precise (thanks to the
numbering device). However, several areas for improvement can be found. The
commitment to completeness means that the diagrams are prone to clutter and may
tend to obscure the key aspects of inference, something which we discuss further
below. Assigning meaning to orientation is an arbitrary convention that places
unnecessary limits on the ways in which diagrams can be constructed. Finally, the
diagrams contain elements that do not relate to any real entity, i.e. to any component
of the corresponding Navya-Nya¯ya expression. The numbered labels fall into this
Fig. 1 The diagrams of Ramesh Chandra Das (2006)
123
Diagrams for Navya-Nyāya
category but, as discussed, certainly perform an important function and are justified
by the requirement of an unambiguous reading order. The treatment of abhāva is
more questionable – this is done using a dashed line to deny the existence of a
relation between two entities. In Fig. 1 the dashed line denies the identity (tādātmya)
relation between pata (pot) and gata (ground). There is no entity forming part of the
underlying meaning to which the dashed line relates.
In his 2001 book Philosophy in Classical India (Ganeri 2001b), Ganeri uses
graphs to illustrate the structure and relations of the Vais´es
˙
ika ontology. The
style of the diagrams arises from the observation that Udayana’s justification of
the ontology differentiates between entities on the basis of inherence, and that
these differences can be seen as properties of a directed graph. Each natural kind
in the ontology is uniquely determined by the number of entities it can inhere in,
and the number of entities that can inhere in it. Thus, what distinguishes a
universal, from the graph-theoretic point of view, is that it is a node with
incoming valency of 0, since a universal is that in which nothing inheres, and so
on for the other kinds.
Each type of node described so far is a bhāva (positive entity) and an arrow
sourced on node a and targeting node b means that a inheres in b. Figure 4 shows an
ontology in which a universal inheres in two qualities; these inhere in a compound
and atomic substance respectively, and so on.1
To represent abha¯va a new type of node and two new edges are introduced. The
¼) edge denotes counterpositiveness (pratiyogita) while the heavy edge is the
Fig. 2 The syntax of Das’
diagrams
Fig. 3 The semantics of
orientation in Das’ diagrams
1 It should be noted that although the graphs adopt the perspective of depicting the inherence relation by
edges, inherence is itself a positive entity not fundamentally different to the entities depicted by nodes.
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absential-spatial relation abhāvīya-svarūpa saṃbhanda. In this way, no non-existent
“denial of relation” is required and, relative to Das, a more authentic state of affairs
is depicted (Fig. 5).
The two notations we have considered each take different approaches to
depicting cognition. Das’ diagrams are designed with vyāpti in mind, and aim for
comprehensiveness, containing everything we need to fully reconstruct a Navya-
Nya¯ya expression. Relative to Ganeri’s graphs, they are rich and flexible: there are
seven distinct types of edge and these may be attached to nodes or to other edges. It
seems to us that this commitment to depict the complete structure of cognition may
occlude the key aspects of inference (note that this is our priority, not that of Das).
In Burton et al. (2018) we argued that this lack of perspicuity can cause the
diagrams to perform quite poorly on several of Cheng’s criteria for effective
diagrammatic representation (Cheng 216). These criteria take the form of design
goals, such as injunctions to use One token for each type and provide an
Overarching interpretive scheme. With their rich syntax and unambiguous reading
order, Das’s diagrams meet these goals. However, our objections explained above
relate to criteria such as Reﬂect the structure of concepts, Coherent encoding of
primary concepts. From a Peircean perspective the sine qua non of logical diagrams
is iconicity, most often glossed as the mode in which signs convey their meaning by
resemblance. This description fails to convey the nuances of the concept however,
which Peirce defined in several places in different ways. One such definition is that
icons are signs from which we can “learn more”, i.e. that provide more information
than was required for their construction. Under this interpretation a sign resembles
its object if and only if study of the sign can yield new information about the object
(Hookway 2002). This is the case for using circles to depict a syllogism – the
conclusion is necessarily contained in and revealed by the premises. A diagram is a
special kind of icon whose parts stand in these relations to each other, and which
comes with rules that allow us to manipulate the parts in reliably valid, illuminating
ways. This aspect of iconicity is also captured under the name well-matchedness
Fig. 4 An ontology in Ganeri’s
graphs
Fig. 5 Abha¯va in Ganeri’s
graphs
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(Gurr 1999). A well-matched notation shares certain important characteristics with
the domain it depicts. For instance, Euler diagrams are well-matched to propositions
and assertions about sets because they have “the potential to directly capture
pertinent aspects of the represented artifact” Gurr and Tourlas (2000). Ambrosio
emphasises the active, contextual nature of iconicity: “‘Constructing’ an icon
amounts to discovering, and selecting, relevant respects in which a representation
captures salient features of the object it stands for.” (Ambrosio 2014). These will be
our design goals in the next section, but for the time being we can safely focus on
the structural correspondences between an iconic sign and its object; such a sign can
be said to have the very relations it represents. Das’ diagrams have certain iconic
features: their node-link structure resembles the locus/locatee structure of a Navya-
Nya¯ya expression; a rectangle, P, connected to a second rectangle, Q, by a vertical
arrow could be said to “resemble” two elements of cognition that are adjuncts in the
inherence relation. However, although two graphical objects joined by an arrow
may be said to resemble any pair of entities bound by a relation, there is nothing
about verticality that resembles inherence. The convention of edge orientation is a
symbolic feature (one which conveys meaning by habit, natural or acquired) and
mitigates or even destroys any iconicity possessed by inherence edges.
Compared to the approach taken by Das, Ganeri’s graphs are minimal, focusing
solely on inherence and absence. They do this in an iconic way that corresponds
ideally with the underlying meaning, in that the graphs have exactly the same
structure as the fragment of cognition that is depicted. They are not expressive
enough for our purpose, however. Consider the task of using Ganeri’s graphs to
depict (or carry out, taking Mullick’s view of anumāna as a schema) the inference
embodied in anumāna 2. Firstly, this inference depends not only on inherence but
also contact (saṃyoga) between entities—smoke and fire are in contact with the
hillside and kitchen (or, more properly, contact delimited by these qualities inheres
in the loci). Suppose we introduce a new type of edge,  to denote contact. Then
Fig. 6 applies the graphs to the inference.2
How can we formalise the application of step (3) to step (2), resulting in (4)? One
of the things which is hard for many newcomers to understand about Navya-Nya¯ya
is the status of the examples – what distinguishes Navya-Nya¯ya from informal
reasoning by analogy? In what sense is this valid reasoning? Authors such as
Schayer, Staal and others have characterised the third step in terms of predicate
logic. For instance, Staal’s occurrence relation, A, links together subject (p, pakṣa),
probandum (s, sādhya) and evidence (h, hetu): Aðh; pÞ ! Aðs; pÞ. (Staal 1973)
Whatever the notation, in order to know that the example presented is a reliable one,
we must consider Din˙na¯ga’s “statement with three characteristics”. We need a
diagrammatic indication that the hetu appears in the pakṣa (shown in step 2), always
occurs in things which are like the pakṣa, and never occurs in those things which are
2 We use the terms “smoke-ness” and “fire-ness” to refer to the universals corresponding to smoke and
fire respectively, which should not be confused with the familiar terms “smokiness” and “fieriness”.
Smokiness is an attribute of the loci (mountain etc.) while smoke-ness is an attribute of smoke. In general,
we add the suffix “-ness” to words to generate a level of abstraction, similarly to the application of the
Sanskrit suffix “-tva”. Thanks to Professor Prabal Sen and an anonymous reviewer for notes on
terminology.
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unlike the pakṣa. But step (3) only shows that the second and third characteristics
are true of the given examples. We need to know that the pakṣa and locus of the
evidence (sapakṣa) are in the same likeness class with regard to the target property,
and conversely for the locus of the counterevidence (vipakṣa). To be used in this
context, Ganeri’s graphs need to be extended since we have no way to describe
these relationships.
Figure 7 shows how Das presents the same inference in a fully specified way.
Through the reading technique, the result corresponds exactly with the intended
meaning but, in our view, becomes cluttered and fails to shed light on the key
aspects of the inference. It could be said that this clutter is not inherent to the
notation, since any aspect of cognition which was not considered salient could be
left out of the diagram. But in a notation which specialises in inference we think it
desirable that diagrams raise the most salient concepts to the foreground. We take
these key aspects of inference to include pervasion, the three characteristics and the
presence of the likeness and unlikeness classes. Therefore, our approach to
designing anumāna diagrams could be summarised as extending Ganeri’s graphs
with additions that expose the essence of anumāna and, in so doing, to take
inspiration for those extensions from Das where possible.
Fig. 6 Inference in Ganeri’s
graphs
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Anuma¯na diagrams with sapaks
˙
a only
We begin by considering the affirmative case in which only positive evidence is
provided. Inferences may be made on the basis of contact (saṃyoga) or inherence
(samavāya); our first example focuses on contact and uses the two-headed arrow,
, for this purpose as before. Figure 8 shows the substances Smoke (S) and Fire (F)
in contact with the Kitchen, labelled K. It also exposes the relevance of this
information by indicating our knowledge of vyāpti and likeness. We use double-
headed arrows ($) to denote joint membership of a likeness class (K and H are
alike). We use an arrow sourced on a entity and targeting a likeness edge to show
what kind of likeness is involved (K and H are alike with respect to F). We also need
to depict the vyāpti relation of pervasion between the substances, for which we use
the ¼) edge (S is pervaded by F). Note that this arrow is a shorthand device; it does
not reflect the full structure of vyāpti, which depends on a more complex set of
relations, but reduces a great deal of clutter and allows the diagrams to maintain
their focus on anumāna. The result is that our diagrams are “high level”, attempting
to reduce complexity by creating diagrammatic syntax which denotes semantic
entities with complex structure. The opposite approach is more common. For
instance, Das has no special edge for vyāpti; one saṃbhanda edge is used for all
relations and labelled accordingly). These choices relate to an ancient distinction in
logical notation; those which reveal the essential or atomic structure of an
expression and are thus well suited for analysis versus those, like ours, which
capture higher level concepts and which are intended for use as a calculus.
Together with the hetu, which is unchanged from Fig. 6, Fig. 9 makes explicit the
information we need to apply the anumāna schema. With the notation for contact
and likeness in place we have the syntactic information to justify relying on the
sapakṣa as evidence and reaching the conclusion on its basis. Figure 10 shows the
Fig. 7 Anumāna in Das’ diagrams Das (2006)
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inference in question, to be defined syntactically in the following section. Finally, to
reach step (5), the conclusion, we need a rule that will allow us to detach nodes from
the graph, as shown in Fig. 11. Next, we define anumāna diagrams at the abstract
level.
Fig. 8 Determining the likeness
class
Fig. 9 Carrying out anumāna
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Abstract syntax
Informally, an abstract anumāna diagram is a graph with five types of edge. Edges
indicating inherence, contact and the vyāpti relation are directed and between nodes.
Edges indicating membership of a likeness class are undirected and between nodes.
The last type of edge is sourced on nodes but targets other edges, indicating the
(directed) relation that determines the identity of the likeness class. Using Fig. 12 as
an example, this diagram will have the following abstract elements:
– A set of nodes, B ¼ fa; b; c; d; e; fg.
– A set of inherence edges, I ¼ fða; bÞ; ðc; dÞg.
– A set of contact edges, C ¼ fðb; eÞ; ðd; eÞg.
– A set of likeness edges, L ¼ fðe; f Þg.
– A set of vyāpti edges, V ¼ fða; cÞg.
– A set of determinor edges, N ¼ ðc; ðe; f ÞÞ (where N stands for nirupaka, i.e.
describer or determinor).
Then the diagram as a whole has the abstraction D ¼ ðB; I;C; L;V;NÞ. We
assume the existence of a countable set of nodes, N .
Deﬁnition 1 Anumāna diagram (sapakṣa only). An anumāna diagram is a tuple
(B, I, C, L, V, N) where:
Fig. 10 Applying knowledge of vyāpti
Fig. 11 Detaching nodes
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– B  N is a set of nodes,
– I;C;V  B B are sets of ordered pairs of nodes,
– L  B B is a set of unordered pairs of nodes, and
– N  B L is a set of ordered pairs of nodes and elements of L.
We next define functions that allow us to access nodes that represent entities with
different natural kinds, based on their valencies and level within the graph.
Deﬁnition 2 Let D ¼ ðB; I;C;L;V;NÞ be an anumāna diagram. Then we define the
following functions:
– univðDÞ ¼ fy 2 B : :9x 2 B ððx; yÞ 2 IÞg are the universal nodes of D,
– qualðDÞ ¼ fy 2 B : 9ðx; yÞ 2 I ðx 2 univðDÞÞg are the quality nodes of D, and
– subsðDÞ ¼ fx 2 B : lðx;DÞ 2g are the substance nodes of D, where l(x, D) is
the level or minimum distance of the node x from a universal via inherence edges
in D as follows:
lðx;DÞ ¼ min 0 ifðy; xÞ 62 I [ C;8ðy; xÞ 2 I ð1þ lðy;DÞÞ otherwise:
  
Returning to the example in Fig. 12, univðDÞ ¼ fa; cg, qualðDÞ ¼ fb; dg and
subsðDÞ ¼ feg. We now need to express several constraints on well-formedness,
given in the next definition.
Deﬁnition 3 (Well-formedness) Let D ¼ ðB; I;C; L;V;NÞ be an anumāna diagram
where the following is true:
– the graph formed by the inherence, contact and likeness edges is connected:
B ¼ fx : ðx; yÞ 2 I [ C [ Lg;
Fig. 12 Abstract syntax of a
diagram
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– D contains universal nodes, quality nodes and substance nodes:
univðDÞ 6¼ ; ^ qualðDÞ 6¼ ; ^ subsðDÞ 6¼ ;;
– likeness edges are between substance nodes:
8ðx; yÞ 2 L ðx; y 2 subsðDÞÞ
– vyāpti edges are between quality nodes:
8ðx; yÞ 2 V ðx; y 2 qualðDÞÞ; and
– determinor edges in are sourced on quality nodes and target likeness edges:
8ðx; ðy; zÞÞ 2 N ðx 2 qualðDÞ ^ ðy; zÞ 2 LÞ:
Then we write that D is well-formed.
When we want to make a new graph by adding nodes to an existing one we
assume that we can draw “fresh”, i.e. heretofore unused, nodes from N . Now we
have enough tools to define inference rules representing the anumāna schema. The
first rule carries out an affirmative inference in the case where contact is involved
and only one example is provided. The identifiers used in the definition of the rule
match those in the example given in Fig. 13, which can be used to help follow the
definition.
Deﬁnition 4 Anumāna (afﬁrmative, contact, sapakṣa only). Let D1 ¼ ðB1; I1;C1;
L1;V1;N1Þ and D2 ¼ ðB2; I2;C2; L2;V2;N2Þ be well-formed anumāna diagrams such
that the following is true:
1. there are nodes p 2 subsðD1Þ, h 2 qualðD1Þ and t 2 univðD1Þ which are
connected as follows: ðt; hÞ 2 I1 and ðh; pÞ 2 C1,
Fig. 13 Identifiers in the definition of the Anumāna rule
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2. there are nodes s 2 subsðD2Þ, h0 2 qualðD2Þ and t0 2 univðD2Þ which are
connected as follows: ðt0; h0Þ 2 I2 and ðh0; sÞ 2 C2,
3. there is a node p0 2 B2 such that ðs; p0Þ 2 L2,
4. there are nodes u 2 univðD2Þ and v 2 qualðD2Þ with edges ðu; vÞ 2 I2 and
ðv; sÞ 2 C2,
5. there is an edge ðh0; vÞ 2 V2, and
6. there is an edge ðv; ðs; p0ÞÞ 2 N2.
Let u0 and v0 be two fresh nodes and let
– B0 ¼ B1 [ fu0; v0g,
– I0 ¼ I1 [ fðu0; v0Þg,
– C0 ¼ C1 [ fðv0; pÞg and
– D3 ¼ ðB0; I0;C0; L;V ;NÞ.
Then we can construct D3 given D1 and D2, written D1;D2 ‘ D3.
Note that this rule will only work as intended when the pairs of nodes t and t0,
h and h0 and p and p0 represent the same entities in the semantic domain. This is a
semantic requirement that cannot be determined at the syntactic level, imposing a
qualification on the soundness of the rule that will be discussed below. The next rule
enables us to detach nodes. We can only do this when we are sure that the process
will maintain well-formedness. We need to avoid the possibilities of leaving the
graph unconnected or of containing a quality in which no universal inheres, for
example. In Fig. 14, if we remove any node from D1 then the result will not be a
well-formed graph. From D2, we can remove either S and Sn, or F and Fn.
Removing any other nodes would result in a badly formed graph.
Figure 15 shows an example of applying the rule; note that the node labels match
the identifiers used in the definition.
Deﬁnition 5 (Inference rule: detach nodes) Let D ¼ ðB; I;C; L;V ;NÞ be an
anumāna diagram such that the following is true:
1. there are nodes t; u 2 univðDÞ, h; v 2 qualðDÞ and p 2 subsðDÞ,
2. there are edges (t, h) and (u, v) in I, and
3. there are edges (h, p) and (v, p) in C.
Let the following be true:
– B0 ¼ B fu; vg,
Fig. 14 Constraints on
detaching nodes
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– I0 ¼ I  fðu; vÞg,
– C0 ¼ I  fðv; pÞg, and
– D0 ¼ ðB0; I0;C0; L;V ;NÞ.
Then we can construct D0 from D, written D ‘ D0.
In the following section we define the semantics of anumāna diagrams and a
mapping between the abstract and semantic levels, before showing that our two
rules are sound.
Semantics
In formalising the semantics of the diagrams we have been faced with a number of
quite difficult choices. Firstly, we believe that to follow one of the traditional styles
used to define the semantic level of formal logics would be to depart from Navya-
Nya¯ya’s intended meaning in a way that undermines our project. It would not make
sense, for example, to use the conventional model-theoretic semantics of predicate
logic typically applied to Euler-based diagrams (e.g. Shin 1994) or Kripke models
and tableaux methods of modal logics (Gasquet et al. 2014), even though the latter
are graph-based. For the same reasons that we reject the use of spatial diagrams, we
aim to look beyond these techniques of constructing and checking models to find
methods that better reflect the true nature of a system which mixes logic and
epistemology. The departures we will have to make from the techniques mentioned
above are necessary because we are dealing with conceptual knowledge rather than
truth-carrying relations. We are attempting to model a system in which intuition
plays an important role and in which certain things may be said to be true for all
time and have objective metaphysical existence.
We consider the existence and contents of likeness and unlikeness classes to be
axiomatic, standing outside any interpretation of a diagram. For any property,
p 2 U, where U is the universe of positive (bha¯va) entities, we can identify the
associated sets LikeðpÞ : PU and UnlikeðpÞ : PU.
To say that a diagram is satisfiable means that it represents a possible cognition.
That will be the case if the structure of the diagram reflects the valencies of the
ontology and if the relations and membership of likeness and unlikeness classes
depicted correspond with the real world. For convenience we require only that
universals are not inhered in by any entity, disregarding the further stipulation that
each universal is exemplified in at least two qualities. Because our diagrams do not
Fig. 15 Identifiers in the
definition of the Detach nodes
rule
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depict individuators (entities in which nothing inheres but which inhere in exactly
one atomic substance), this is enough to make the valency of universals unique. Our
diagrams are fragments of cognition; as stated above, we make no attempt to show
the Nya¯yan view of cognition exhaustively.
An interpretation, I ¼ ðU; Þ, is a pair whose elements are a universe and a
mapping between nodes and that set, : N ! U. U is intended to denote the real
universe so for any subset, U  U, we may not presume that we know its full extent.
For instance, consider the concept Dog within U, i.e. those compound substances in
U that meet some definition of the anugama class Dog. We can never know the
extent of Dog, only its intent; those properties that must be possessed by its
members, such being a mammal, having four legs and so on. In practice, we can
only indicate the set by listing those entities which we know must be present in U.
We will demonstrate these ideas reusing Fig. 12 and its abstraction as an example,
and duplicate the diagram in Fig. 16 for convenience. Any interpretation for this
diagram, ðU; Þ, must meet the following requirements:
– The universe must contain at least six elements, say
U ¼ fSmoke;Smoke-ness;Fire;Fire-ness;Kitchen;Hearth; . . .g:
– These elements should have the right natural kinds: Smoke-ness and Fire-ness
are universals, Smoke, Fire, Kitchen and Hearth are substances.
– The desired relations persist between the elements: Smoke-ness inheres in
Smoke, which is in contact with Kitchen and so on for the other inherence and
contact edges in the diagram. Smoke and Fire are adjuncts in the vyāpti relation.
Furthermore,
Kitchen;Hearth 2 LikeðFireÞ:
– The mapping, , maps nodes to the appropriate entities: ¼ fða;Smoke-nessÞ,
ðb;SmokeÞ, ðc;Fire-nessÞ, ðd;FireÞ, ðe;KitchenÞ, ðf ;HearthÞg.
Fig. 16 Semantics of a diagram
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We next define three conditions that, we will go on to show, form the basis of
satisfiability.
Deﬁnition 6 (Three conditions) Let D ¼ ðB; I;C; L;V;NÞ be a well-formed
anumāna diagram and I ¼ ðU; Þ be an interpretation. Let inhðUÞ and conðUÞ be
the extents of the inherence and contact relations in U and let lðe;UÞ be the
extension of the l (level) function to the inherence relation at the semantic level. Let
the following conditions be true:
1. Bhava condition Each node maps to a distinct entity in the interpretation. That
is,
8a; b 2 BððaÞ; ðbÞ 2 U ^ a 6¼ b) ðaÞ 6¼ ðbÞÞ:
2. Ontology condition maps the nodes in univðDÞ, qualðDÞ and subsðDÞ to
universals, qualities and substances in U, respectively. That is,
8u 2 univðDÞð:9x 2 Uððx; ðuÞÞ 2 inhðUÞÞÞ;
8q 2 qualðDÞ ð9u 2 U ððu; ðqÞÞ 2 inhðUÞ
^ :9x 2 Uððx; uÞ 2 inhðUÞÞÞ
^ :9y 2 U ððy; ðqÞ 2 inhðUÞ ^ y 6¼ uÞÞÞ; and
s 2 subsðDÞ ) lððsÞ;UÞ 2:
3. Saṃbhanda condition For each edge between two nodes in D, the correspond-
ing relation between entities exists:
(a) if ða; bÞ 2 I then ððaÞ; ðbÞÞ 2 inhðUÞ,
(b) if ða; bÞ 2 C then ððaÞ; ðbÞÞ 2 conðUÞ,
(c) if ðb; cÞ 2 L then there is an edge ða; ðb; cÞÞ 2 P such that ðbÞ; ðcÞ 2 LikeððaÞÞ,
(d) if ða; bÞ 2 V then ðaÞ and ðbÞ are adjuncts in the vyāpti relation.
Theorem 1 (Satisfiability) Let D ¼ ðB; I;C; L;V ;NÞ be a well-formed anumāna
diagram and I ¼ ðU; Þ be an interpretation. I is a model for D if and only if the
three conditions hold for D with respect to I .
Proof First we show that if the three conditions hold then I is a model. Since the
Bha¯va Condition holds then every node represents a real and distinct entity. That is,
the following is true:
ðBÞ ¼
[
b2B
ðbÞ  U;
and no two nodes in the abstract diagram denote the same entity. The Ontology
Condition means that nodes in the diagram map to entities of the corresponding
natural kind and ensures that the diagram reflects the proper ontological structure.
Since this condition holds then each u 2 univðDÞ maps to an entity in U in which
nothing inheres. Each q 2 qualðDÞ maps to an entity in which one universal inheres
and each s 2 subsðDÞ maps to a substance, i.e. an entity in which only qualities
inhere.
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The Sam
˙
bhanda Condition means that each edge in D denotes that the
corresponding relation holds between the two corresponding entities in U. It also
ensures that each pair of entities that the diagram depicts as belonging to a likeness
class do indeed belong to that class. Thus, the diagram represents a viable cognition
and I is a model for D.
For the other direction, assume that the Bha¯va Condition does not hold and that
there exists a b 2 B such that ðbÞ 62 U. Then maps this node to an entity which does
not exist in U and I is not a model for D. Otherwise there exists a distinct pair of
nodes a; b 2 B such that ðaÞ ¼ ðbÞ, and is again inadequate.
Suppose that the Ontology Condition does not hold and so there is a node
u 2 univðDÞ such that there exists an entity x 2 U and ðx; ðuÞÞ 2 inhðUÞ. Then ðuÞ is
not a universal and I is not a model for D. Similarly for the other ontological types.
If the Sam
˙
bhanda Condition does not hold then it can be shown in a similar way that
I is not a model for D. Therefore I is a model for D if and only if the three
conditions hold. (
Theorem 2 Let D ¼ ðB; I;C; L;V ;NÞ be a well-formed anumāna diagram. Then
there exists an interpretation I , which is a model for D.
Proof (Sketch) By theorem 1, the theorem is true if we can construct an I such that
the three conditions hold. We can see that it must always be possible to identify
some U  U and construct a mapping, , so that the Bha¯va Condition holds. Since
D is well-formed the edges in D represent a possible cognition with respect to the
Ontology and sam
˙
bhanda conditions. (
Next we give a sketch of the proof that our first inference rule is sound.
Theorem 3 Inference rule: Anumāna (afﬁrmative, contact, sapakṣa only) is sound
Let D1, D2 and D3 be anumāna diagrams so that D1;D2 ‘ D3 as per the deﬁnition of
the rule. Furthermore, let t, h and p, and t0, h0 and p0 be nodes in D1 and D2
respectively as per the deﬁnition of the rule. Then any model for both D1 and D2 is a
model for D3 and the rule is valid, written D1;D2D3, if and only if the pairs of
nodes t and t0, h and h0 and p and p0 represent the same entities in the semantic
domain.
Proof (Sketch) First we show that if the salient nodes in D1 and D2 do not represent
the same entities in the semantic domain then the application of the rule is invalid.
Let I ¼ ðU; Þ be any interpretation. Assume that D1 and D2 are well-formed. From
D2 we know that the quality ðh0Þ pervades the quality ðvÞ. However, if h and h0 do
not represent the same entity, i.e. ðhÞ 6¼ ðh0Þ, then we have no knowledge of any
relation between ðhÞ and ðvÞ and any application of the rule is unsound. By the same
reasoning, the application of the rule is unsound if ðtÞ 6¼ ðt0Þ or ðpÞ 6¼ ðp0Þ.
For the other direction we need to start by showing that we can construct an
interpretation which is a model for both D1 and D2. By theorem 2 we can construct
an interpretation, I , which models D2. Then we can trivially extend I to reflect the
information present in D1. We know from the definition of the rule that the evidence
of the property we wish to prove in D1 exists in both D1 and D2. Also, we know that
the relevant likeness class information is present in D2. D3 is a copy of D1 to which
two nodes, u0 and v0, have been added. We know that these nodes represent entities
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which are related to each other in the appropriate way since I is a model for D2.
Thus, the application of the rule is sound if the salient nodes in D1 and D2 represent
the same entities in the semantic domain. (
We omit the proof for the soundness of the second rule, which merely weakens
information.
Theorem 4 Inference rule: detach nodes is sound. Let D1 and D2 be anumāna
diagrams as per the deﬁnition of the rule. Then any model for D1 is a model for D2
and the rule is valid, written D1D2.
Next we consider the situation in which both positive and negative corroborating
evidence is required.
Anuma¯na with negation
To depict a negated thesis (e.g. “word is not eternal”) or a counterexample (e.g. “as
not in the lake”) we need a device to represent abha¯va. We use Ganeri’s notation for
absential nodes (a circle with a filled circle inside it) and absential-spatial relations
(a heavy black edge). Since Ganeri used the ¼) edge to denote the counterpositive
relation (already used by us to denote vyāpti), we make use of the harpoon edge (⥋)
that Das employed for this purpose. Figure 17 depicts double negation, where Bn
represents blueness, B represents a particular shade of blue and P represents pot; the
absence of the absence of blue is located in a blue pot (Guha 2016, p. 207).
Incorporating new notation to express unlikeness, Fig. 18 tells us that the absence
of S (smoke) and the absence of F (fire) both inhere in L (the lake). The “broken”
double-headed arrow denotes joint membership of an unlikeness class. So, Fig. 18
also asserts that L and H (the hillside) are joint members of the unlikeness class
determined by the universal Fn, fire-ness.
We will need a new anumāna rule which can be applied when vipakṣa is
required, taking the form demonstrated in Fig. 19.
Our final example is another in which negation plays a prominent role. Not only are
both sapakṣa and vipakṣa provided but the thesis/conclusion is negative. It differs
from earlier examples in relying only on inherence and not contact. This is Anumāna 1
(see p. 3), having the thesis “Word is not eternal”, given as a diagram in Fig. 20.
The extension of the formalism from the previous section to accommodate the
inference in Fig. 20 is straightforward. The definition of abstract diagrams would
Fig. 17 Double negation
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require a second set of nodes, A  N , disjoint from the bha¯va set and representing
absential entities. The abstraction would also require two new sets of edges to
represent the two new types of edge. We would need to define a new condition with
respect to satisfiability, the Abhāva Condition. Similarly to the Bha¯va Condition,
this must state that each absential node maps to a distinct entity in the universal
domain. The Sam
˙
bhanda Condition would also need to be extended to verify that
the new edges do indeed represent relations that exist between entities. Two new
inference rules are needed, one which applies anumāna taking vipakṣa into account,
and one which removes absential nodes. We will omit the extended formalisation
for reasons of space and because these details are similar to what has gone before.
Conclusion
The main content of this paper has been the definition and explanation of anumāna
diagrams, but we are aware that we also need to justify and motivate the use of
diagrammatic reasoning in this domain. Our goal has been to construct logical
diagrams that reflect the meaning of Navya-Nya¯ya, particularly those concepts and
relations involved in vyāpti and the anumāna schema. To “reflect the meaning” of
Fig. 18 Determining the
unlikeness class
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S
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F
Fn
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H
S
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K
F
Fn
H
S
Sn
Fig. 19 Applying vyapti with sapakṣa and vipakṣa
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those concepts and relations implies more than simply inventing a notation and
defining the correspondence between elements of its syntax and the underlying
meaning. The potential of diagrammatic reasoning is for this reflection of meaning
to expose the most relevant relations at work in a logical expression and enable the
viewer to manipulate those relations directly. We have described iconic signs above
as signs from which we can “learn more”. There are several reasons that we should
not expect our diagrams to make their conclusions necessary and apparent in the
manner of Euler diagrams: the information conveyed is more complex and is not
made up of truth-carrying predicates. However, they are designed with attention
focused on choice of notation which is careful to make the best use of earlier efforts
and to fit each piece of the notation to its particular semantics. Designing and using
iconic diagrams in this way can shed light on the underlying structures of reasoning
in a particular system, and on what it means to think diagrammatically. This
perspective informed our critical analysis of prior work in the area and fed directly
into the style and content of the diagrams.
As well as presenting the full formalisation (i.e. including the vipakṣa notation),
we plan to extend the notation to cover a larger fragment of Navya-Nya¯ya. This can
be done by adding notation to accommodate ternary relations and concepts such as
paryapti, as well as additional rules such as those dealing with negation. However,
an important precursor to that extension would be to establish the content of a
logically complete notation and set of rules. This would lay the ground work for a
principled dialogue between formal representation and the literature of Indian logic.
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Fig. 20 Negation in sapakṣa and vipakṣa
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